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Abstract-With the increased awareness of the dangers of 
cyberterrorism and identity fraud, the security of information 
systems has been propelled to the forefront as organizations  
strive to implement greater access control. Access control for 
information systems is founded upon reliable user 
authentication, and the predominant form of authentication 
remains the username-password combination. There are 
several vulnerabilities associated with an over-reliance upon 
this method of authentication, stemming from weaknesses in 
both the user construction of passwords and single-layer 
authentication techniques. The growing number of Internet 
business transactions highlights the need for a more secure 
method of user authentication that is cost-effective as well as 
practical. A multi-layer user authentication scheme is proposed 
as a solution, incorporating the use of dynamic biometric data 
selection and a timestamp to guard against reuse of intercepted 
authentication bit streams. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
omputer-based information systems are becoming 
increasingly vital to the su ccess of many businesses. 
As organizations move to adapt to the digital era, the 
quantity of confidential and sensitive data stored in 
electronic form on computers continues to increase at a 
blinding pace. The growing trend in customer relationship 
management and the need to offer personalization through 
customized information further adds to the wealth of data 
contained in these information systems. Since the 
compromise of the sensitive data stored in information 
systems can be disastrous for an organization, the security of 
these systems is of  utmost concern. Given that "practically 
every penetration of a computer system, at some stage, relies 
on the ability to compromise a password‖ it seems rather 
surprising that passwords continue to form the basis of user 
authentication methods. In the password-based scheme, 
users of the information system are required to enter a 
username password combination. The username establishes 
the identity of an individual as a valid user, and the 
password serves to confirm that identity and provide access 
to authorized resources. Passwords are inherently weak 
security constructs due to the ability of hackers to guess 
them through brute-force methods enabled by the processing 
power of today's computers. Despite their knowledge of the  
vulnerability posed by password-based user authentication  
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systems, information systems managers continue to rely 
heavily upon single authentication using password-based  
access control because of its low implementation cost and 
end-user convenience. In the case of Internet web sites that 
require user authentication to provide personalized 
information or sensitive data, there does not appear to be a 
cost-effective alternative to the use of the username-
password pair for access control. While major corporations 
have the financial ability to augment the security of their 
intranets and extranets through the use of smart cards and 
token devices, it is impractical and far too costly for 
business-to-consumer web sites to deploy this same 
technology. Such an effort would require the manufacture 
and shipment of a special token or smart card for every 
registrant on every web site. It is in this context of Internet 
transactions and electronic commerce (ecommerce) where 
the issue of information system security will be explored. 
The purpose of this study is to analyze in detail the inherent 
flaws in password-based user authentication and propose a 
solution to address how managers can effectively increase 
information system security and maintain access control 
through an improvement in the user authentication schemes 
at the root of current information security policy 
II. VULNERABILITIES OF PASSWORD-BASED USER 
AUTHENTICATION 
Information security is concerned with enabling authorized 
users to access appropriate resources and denying such 
access to unauthorized users. The ability to authenticate 
valid users is therefore at the foundation of any access 
control system. Passwords have long been the access control 
method of choice for most organizations, in part because of 
their low implementation cost and convenience to users. 
However, password-based authentication schemes have 
several vulnerabilities 
1. Weaknesses in Password Construction 
2. Ease of Password Compromise 
3.Alternatives to Password-Based Authentication 
When juxtaposed with the tendency of individuals to reuse 
the same username password combinations across several 
web sites, these factors reveal the lack of security offered 
by information systems that grant access based solely on the 
input of a valid username-password combination. 
A. Weaknesses in Password Construction 
often contributes to its weakness as a security mechanism. 
When passwords are generated by computer, they are 
generally more secure at the expense of being harder to 
remember. Userselected passwords, on the other hand, have 
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the added benefit of being easier to recall, but are usually 
less secure in their construction. Case studies of real users 
over the past two decades reveal that characteristics of user-
selected passwords have not changed significantly in 
response to publicity of information security breaches. 
According to a study by Morris and Thompson (1979), more 
than 85 percent of user passwords were dictionary words; 
words spelled backwards, names of people or places, or a 
sequence of numbers. Further investigated the 
characteristics of user passwords, and examined issues such 
as password length, character composition, reset frequency, 
and the use of personal information as passwords. They 
conducted a survey of a sample of computer users by using 
an anonymous questionnaire that inquired about the users' 
password features. According to the study, they determined 
that the majority of passwords contained either five or 
six characters. Furthermore, their survey revealed the 
following 
71.9% of respondent‘s passwords were between one and six 
Characters 
80.1% of passwords were composed of strictly alphabetic 
characters 
79.6% of respondents never changed their passwords 
65.2% of respondents had used personal information in their 
password 
35.3% of users wrote down their passwords nearby to 
remember them 
Computer users tend to choose passwords that are short, 
constant, and based on their surroundings or personal 
information. Studies of user-selected passwords highlight 
that the common features of the passwords have remained 
fairly consistent over time. The underlying reason for this 
consistency is a matter of convenience for the end-users, 
who choose a password that will be simple and easy for 
them to remember. Hackers are undoubtedly aware of 
this trend and can subsequently focus their efforts to guess 
user passwords. 
B.  Ease of Password Compromise 
The second vulnerability of the password-based user 
authentication scheme is the ease with which hackers can 
obtain these passwords. The common characteristics of the 
overwhelming majority of passwords are the primary reason 
that passwords are easily compromised. Knowing that most 
passwords are short, alphabetic or alphanumeric strings of 
characters, hackers can run brute-force attacks that use 
dictionary words, proper names, and numbers to gain illegal 
access to information systems. Passwords can also be 
obtained by intercepting their transmission over 
communications channels, a technique known as "password 
sniffing". Given the findings of Zviran & Haga (1999) that 
over a third of users write down their passwords nearby, a 
password in this case "is no longer something to be guessed 
but becomes something to be located". If an observer is able 
to see the user's password written down somewhere, or 
happens to see the user type the password, then the security 
of the password is subsequently compromised. Furthermore, 
despite creating passwords that are easy to remember, 
computer users are often faced with the burdensome task of 
remembering many passwords. As a result, users place 
repeated calls to help desks to obtain their password or to 
have it reset. An intruder with knowledge of a valid 
username can just as easily contact the help desk and obtain 
a working password, enabling him to then log in using the 
valid username-password combination. 
C. Alternatives to Password-Based Authentication 
The weaknesses associated with password-based access 
control can be overcome by taking advantage of alternative 
methods of user 
authentication. According to Lui and Silverman (2001), the 
following three categories can be used for authentication 
purposes. 
1. Knowledge, "something you know" 
2. Possession, "something you have" 
3. Biometric, "something you are" 
The first category includes information known by an 
individual, such as a password or personal identification 
number (PIN). The second category consists of an 
identifiable physical object that an individual possesses, 
such as a smart card, token, or identification badge. The 
third category, known as biometrics, includes biological 
attributes specific to an individual. The third category of 
user authentication, called nbiometrics, involves an 
identifier that cannot be misplaced or forgotten (Liu and 
Silverman, 2001). Biometric devices use physical, biological 
features to identify and verify individuals. A biometric can 
take many forms, and in fact, any physical or behavioral 
characteristic of a person that can serve to uniquely identify 
that person can be considered a biometric. Examples include 
a fingerprint, hand geometric pattern, iris, retina, voice, 
signature, facial pattern, or even DNA (Liu and Silverman, 
2001). Commonly accepted as evidence in law enforcement, 
a biometric is considered by many people Regardless of the 
specific type of biometric used, the first step in 
implementing a biometric-based authentication system is 
generally to store a template of the biometric data of a user. 
Upon a subsequent attempt to access the information 
system, the user must present the required biometric 
identifier to a scanning or recording device, which then 
compares the input to the database of templates for a 
potential match. The need to store a biometric template for 
each user is, unfortunately, one of the major drawbacks of 
biometric-based authentication systems. Scalability becomes 
a major hurdle because the amount of time it takes a system 
to verify an individual increases significantly as more 
templates are added and checked against everym input. 
Bandwidth likewise becomes a significant issue since the 
digitized data from biometric inputs can be quite large.To be 
the most secure method of uniquely identifying individuals. 
Biometric-based authentication is considered to be 
extremely reliable, but like any authentication system, it is 
not foolproof. It is necessary for information systems 
managers to decide upon an acceptable balance between the 
false acceptance rate (FAR) and the false rejection rate 
(FRR) of a biometric system. The false acceptance rate is a 
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measure of what percentage of unauthorized users are 
granted access to the system due to similarities between the 
user and a stored template that are close enough to be 
considered a match. The false rejection rate, on the other 
hand, is a measure of the percentage of authorized users who 
are refused access, generally due to extraneous factors such 
as lighting or cleanliness variations of the subject. 
Higher success rates of user identification may come at the 
expense of other disadvantages, however. While some 
biometric systems can read a user's input through a non-
invasive method (such as signature recognition), other 
methods such as retinal scanning may seem somewhat 
uncomfortable for users. Furthermore, in the unlikely but 
possible event that biometric data is compromised, new 
biological features cannot be distributed to an individual as 
easily as passwords can be reset. With their personal 
biometric data stored on servers, users are faced with the 
fear that their data will be compromised or their privacy 
violated. And finally, them financial cost of such a system 
cannot be ignored. Biometric systems are perhaps the most 
costly method of authentication to implement. Nonetheless, 
the additional security they provide must be factored into an 
analysis of their practicality and usefulness. User 
authentication controls, whether based on passwords, 
tokens, cards, or biometrics, provide a layer of security to 
information systems. However, each of these access control 
methods relies upon a single layer of authentication and can 
be compromised in a single step. The security of 
information systems can be increased through a technique 
called double authentication, which relies upon a 
combination of methods to perform user authentication and 
verification. This technique is much more secure than access 
control based on single-layer authentication because even if 
one form of authentication is compromised, there is an 
additional check in place to prevent unauthorized access to 
information system resources. Double authentication can 
take many forms. Several of these dual-layer systems have 
been inn existence for quite some time, while other 
combinations are just emerging. Perhaps the most well 
known double authentication technique is the use of a 
magnetic card along with a PIN known by the user. Banks 
have been using this dual layer of authentication at 
automated teller machines (ATMs) or with debit cards. This 
system incorporates something that the user possesses (the 
magnetic card) with something that the user knows (the 
PIN), thereby providing two layers of authentication before 
providing access to finances. Even in the event that an 
individual's debit card is stolen, the thief must also know the 
user's PIN for the card to be of any use. The combination of 
a PIN and a possession is also utilized by most token-based 
access control systems. Instead of a magnetic card, users 
possess a token that displays a dynamic numeric access 
code. This code must be entered along with the user's PIN in 
order to gain access to the system. Token-based systems 
involving a token and PIN combination are slightly more 
secure than a magnetic card and PIN combination because 
the former also makes use of a timestamp to prevent 
password re-use. A timestamp is a date and time associated 
with the moment a password is entered by the user, and it 
must fall within the time specified by the server that a 
particular password is still valid. If a hacker, for example, 
knows the account number on a user's magnetic card and 
knows the user's PIN, he is able to compromise the system. 
On the other hand, even if a hacker is able to determine what 
number a user entered from the 
token and what number the user entered as a PIN, the hacker 
is unable to use that information to subsequently 
compromise the system since the number on the token will 
have changed. Biometrics can even be used in conjunction 
with other forms of authentication to provide a greater 
degree of reliability. The emergence of "hybrid technology" 
that encodes a user's biometric template on a smart 
card/sensor device. This device enables users to scan their 
fingerprint directly on a portable card, which compares the 
scanned information with the biometric data stored on the 
card. While biometrics offer increased security over other 
methods of authentication, this device can still be stolen and 
with it, an individual's biometric data. As mentioned earlier, 
the consequences of compromising a full biometric template 
are severe since an individual only possesses one set of 
fingerprints for life. In addition, the technology already 
exists to lift a fingerprint from a surface and manufacture a 
false finger capable of fooling some biometric sensors. As a 
result, new biometric sensors are emerging that  can detect 
the presence of a live finger by 
reading a pulse. 
The biometric smart card is nonetheless a step in the right 
direction. Due to the storage of biometric data on the device 
itself, it is much faster than conventional biometric systems 
that store a user's biometric template on a server. When 
biometric data is stored on a central server, it takes a 
significant amount of time for the system to search every 
template in its database to find a match. As a result, some 
companies including MasterCard have implemented a 
system in which the user first indicates his or her name 
(which does not add much security), and that individual's 
biometric template is then retrieved from the database. The 
individual then submits to a biometric scan that is compared 
with the template pulled from the database. Using this 
method, the system does not have to compare a scan with 
every template in the database. 
Of all the forms of user authentication, biometrics is 
considered to be the most difficult to compromise. The 
combination of biometrics with alternative forms of 
authentication therefore seems to provide the most secure 
method of access control. 
III. PROPOSED SOLUTION TO USER AUTHENTICATION FOR 
E-BUSINESS APPLICATIONS 
The proposed solution to increase the security of Internet 
transactions in a cost-effective manner makes use of all 
three aforementioned categories of user authentication. This 
multi-layer authentication method combines the use of a 
PIN (something the user knows), a magnetic card 
(something the user has), and a biometric sample (something 
the user is). However, simply combining all three 
technologies will not solve the problem of secure user 




authentication unless it is cheap, versatile, and accepted by 
users. The proposed security solution satisfies all three 
criteria. In order for this approach to be implemented, a  
small hardware investment is required on the  user's  end.  
Specifically,  this  proposal  would  require the use of a 
specialized keyboard that  contained a USB card reader as 
well as a small  fingerprint scanner. Such an approach would 
be  very  cost-effective  because  each  web  site  wishing to 
conduct electronic business would not  have to spend time 
and money to distribute tokens or smart cards to each user, 
and instead  could take advantage of a technology that can 
be  purchased once and used for all web sites. The proposed 
solution will require each individual to have a username 
stored on a magnetic strip card. The username must be a 
unique string of both alphanumeric and symbolic characters 
and a recommended length of ten such characters, such as 
"m49K2g#%6L". This string must not contain as a substring 
the individual's name or social security number. Since the 
majority of Internet transactions take place with the use of a 
major credit card, it would seem logical to work with the 
credit card companies to add an individual's username to the 
data currently stored on the magnetic strip on a credit card. 
An individual would specify at the time of applying for a 
credit card if he desired that specific credit card to contain 
his username, and that card-issuing company would then 
create a username for the cardholder and encode it on the 
card. The credit card- username technique would not add 
any significant cost to the distribution of usernames, would 
be portable (in the user's wallet), and would enable the user 
to maintain the same username across multiple sites, 
eliminating the need to remember multiple usernames. 
Secondly, the user would select a PIN upon registering at 
each web site. This PIN will be known only by the user and 
not recorded anywhere. In addition, the user can choose to 
have a separate PIN for each e-business web site but can 
also securely use the same PIN for each site. This apparent 
security vulnerability warrants further explanation. The PIN 
would not be stored anywhere and would serve to tell the 
fingerprint scanner which bits of the user's scanned 
biometric reading to use for authentication purposes. 
Combining each of these features, the proposed solution for 
secure user authentication during Internet transactions 
would work according to the following procedure. Upon 
registering at a web site, the user would first enter his 
username and then swipe the credit card encoded with the 
same username for initial verification. The user would then 
be prompted to scan his finger on the biometric sensor 
attached to the keyboard. The biometric scanner would 
detect whether a live finger or a fake has been presented as 
input by reading a pulse from the source. The digitized 
biometric data would only be stored locally for 60 seconds. 
During that time, the user would enter his PIN (the user 
PIN), and the web site would send a numeric value 
(henceforth labeled the site PIN) as well as a timestamp. The 
PIN and the number sent by the web site would specify 
which combined bits of the biometric reading to use as the 
individual's password for that particular website, and this 
combination of biometric data bits (henceforth labeled the 
biopair value) would be sent back to the website with the 
user's timestamp. The biometric data sent to the website 
would only be a small portion of the user's full biometric 
reading, thereby maintaining the privacy of the actual 
biometric reading and avoiding the high bandwidth 
transmission of an entire reading. The timestamp would 
ensure that the biometric reading occurred within a specified 
time range after the request by the website was issued. This 
procedure is illustrated in Figure 1.2. 
Each e-business web site would only be responsible for 
storing a username, site PIN, and biopair value for each 
user, a feature that enables this multi-layer authentication 
technique to be completely scalable. Upon each subsequent 
visit to a site, the user would have to be authenticated and 
then permitted to perform any number of business-to-
business or business-to-consumer transactions that are 
permitted for the specified user on that site. To perform each 
authentication, the site would query its database for the 
username and return the associated site PIN to the biometric 
scanner. The user would once again scan his finger and enter 
his PIN, and the scanner would combine the bits of the 
biometric reading specified by the user PIN with the bits 
specified by the site PIN. This combined value would be 
sent back to the web site, which would then compare this 
biopair with the biopair value in its database. 
This multi-layer authentication technique solves a number of 
the problems with current methods of authentication. 
Privacy of biometric data is maintained and bandwidth 
resources are not overwhelmed since only a portion of the 
full biometric reading is sent over the Internet or stored in a 
web site's database. User PINs, which are known by the user 
and not stored anywhere, ensure that a user can specify 
which bits from his biometric reading to use as part of his 
password. This technique enables a user to change his 
biometric site password at any time by merely changing his 
PIN. Even if a biometric transmission is intercepted, the 
timestamp ensures that the intercepted information cannot 
be reused, and the relationship of the biometric reading to 
the PIN ensures that the password can be changed if 
compromised. The problem with current biometric systems 
is that since the full biometric data is used for the 
comparison, a compromise of the data would be severe 
because a user has a limited number of fingerprints. Since 
each web site associates its own site PIN with each user's 
biopair value, a password that is hacked from one web site 
cannot be used to gain access to other sites, even though the 
username is the same. This approach thereby enables users 
to use the same username and PIN for every web site 
without sacrificing security. 
The downside to this technique lies in the added cost to the 
user in additional hardware functionality. However, this 
one-time cost is far outweighed by the increased level of 
security offered by this multi-layer authentication method. 
In addition, the keyboard scanner is extremely versatile in 
that it can be used for every e-business site that chooses to 
implement this security method. This increased level of 
security across all sites can therefore be obtained at a cost 
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much less than if the user had to purchase a token or 
proprietary biometric scanner from each e-business. 
IV. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
Passwords remain the most prevalent method of user 
authentication for information systems, and especially 
Internet transactions for e-business. Password-based 
authentication is lacking in security due to several factors 
contributing to the weakness of password construction and 
the ease with which passwords can subsequently be 
compromised. The Computer Security Institute (2002) 
reported in its "Computer Crime and Security Survey" that 
38 percent of responding corporations has security breaches 
resulting from unauthorized access to areas of their web 
sites. 
Alternative forms of user authentication, including tokens, 
smart cards, and biometrics, attempt to address some of the 
vulnerabilities of password-based systems, but suffer from 
their own vulnerabilities when employed in a single layer 
authentication scheme. Double authentication techniques 
have been developed which combine the methods of two 
authentication techniques to increase the level of security of 
information systems. E-business transactions have yet to 
take advantage of increased security in user authentication 
methods due to the high costs associated with a large scale 
deployment of double authentication technology by each 
individual site. The cost of increased security remains a 
principle inhibitor to its implementation, and the percentage 
of  information technology budgets allotted to security has 
not kept pace with the increase in threats. In 2002, 
businesses reportedly spent only 11.8% of their information 
technology budget on security. The multi-layer 
authentication method proposed in this study can increase 
the security of web-based transactions by providing a more 
reliable way to authenticate valid users and simultaneously 
reduce security implementation costs through the adoption 
of a single technology source usable by all e-business web 
sites. While this study has laid the groundwork for a 
proposal to increase the security of Internet transactions, 
there are several areas that can be nexplored as further 
extensions of this research. Future study can look into the 
methods of authentication used by the 0.5 percent of Internet 
transactions identified as using more than strictly passwords 
(Radcliff, 2002). In addition, further research can analyze 
the multi-layer authentication method proposed in this study 
to determine its possible areas of vulnerability. And finally, 
the physical keyboard-scanner technology central to this 
proposal can be explored to reduce the cost of such a device 
and propel its 
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